represent the amount of an individual contributing in a game, here x is the cooperative investment.
In addition, the strategy x may as well indicate the probability that a player invests 1 and otherwise invests 0, here x is the cooperative probability. The production function, describing the relationship between the average investment per person in a group s and the public good produced, is denoted by g(s). The initial endowment is added to the payoff and the remaining function denoted by h(s) is used to describe the link between the investment s and the initial endowment minus the cost incurred by the investment. The production function g(s) is assumed to be increasing satisfying g(0) = 0, and the remaining function h(s) be decreasing satisfying h(0) = 1 and h(1) = 0.
Assume the population is well mixed and contains X individuals with strategy z and N − X individuals with strategy w. A z strategist finds its n − 1 interactive partners consisting of i individuals of strategy z and n − 1 − i individuals of strategy w with the probability
In terms of the cooperative investment, the payoff of a z strategist, P(z, w, i + 1), in a group having i + 1 individuals of strategy z and n − 1 − i individuals of strategy w is P(z, w, i + 1) = g(
In terms of the cooperative probability, out of i individuals of strategy z and n − 1 − i individuals of strategy w, the probability that there are k cooperators and i − k defectors from i individuals of strategy z and l cooperators and n − 1 − i − l defectors from n − i individuals of strategy w is i k n−1−i l z k (1 − z) i−k w l (1 − w) n−1−i−l . In this case, the payoff of a z strategist, P(z, w, i + 1), in a group having i + 1 individuals of strategy z and n − 1 − i individuals of strategy w is
Taking the weighted average over all possible numbers of z strategists in the interactive partners, with the weights given by the probabilities Eq.(1), yields the average payoff of a z strategist in a population with X individuals of strategy z and N − X individuals of strategy w, f (z, w, X),
where a 1 ∧ a 2 represents the smaller one between a 1 and a 2 .
We adopt the frequency dependent Moran process to update the strategy. In each time step, all individuals initially compete to reproduce an offspring. The probability that each individual reproduces is proportional to his payoff. With probability u, the offspring inherits the strategy of his parent. With complementary probability 1 − u, a mutant emerges whose strategy obeys a symmetric probability distribution with the parent strategy as mean and with the variance denoted by σ. Subsequently, a randomly equiprobably chosen individual is replaced by the offspring.
Therefore, the population size remains constant during the evolutionary process. The fixation probability of a single mutant with strategy z in a resident population with strategy w can be explicitly written down,
.
Throughout, ρ(y, x) and p(y, x) separately represent the fixation probability and the payoff of a single mutant with y in a resident population that is monomorphic for x, x (t) is the first-order
∂y m is replaced by x.
II. ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS
The adaptive dynamics applies to stochastic systems just as it is for deterministic systems and say that the evolution on average takes the population up the gradient of 'invasion fitness'. 'Invasion fitness' has frequently been assumed to be the payoff of a single mutant, suggesting the population size is infinitely large [1] [2] [3] [4] . Such assumption upon 'invasion fitness' has been theoretically confirmed for a frequency independent process [5] . Such deterministic adaptive dynamics gives a good approximation for the dynamics in large but finite populations, yet it is still unknown how exactly large the population should be for the approximation to work. In small populations, researchers have argued that it is the fixation probability rather than the payoff that carries the important information for evolution [6] [7] [8] [9] . However in large populations, it remains unresolved which of these two types of 'invasion fitness' can better follow the adaptive evolution.
Following the derivation in [5] , we will obtain the deterministic approximation in first order and third order for the mean path of x. We assume that the mutation rate u is sufficiently small so that the mutant strategy or the resident strategy reaches fixation before a new mutant occurs. Let p(x, t) be the probability that the strategy in the population is x at time t. By virtue of the Markov
where w(y, x) is the transition probability per unit time for the strategy substitution x → y. Since mutation and selection are uncorrelated, w(y,
is the probability of the mutation from x to y and N is the population size.
'Invasion fitness' ζ(y, x) denotes the growth rate of a single mutant with y in a resident population that is monomorphic for x. In small populations, it is measured by ρ(y, x) − ρ(x, x) according to the Markov process, but in large populations, it is measured by ρ(y, x) − ρ(x, x) according to the Markov process or p(y, x) − p(x, x) according to the replicator dynamics. The mean path of the strategy substitutions is denoted by x (t) and defined as
Neglecting the order of integration and differential, we can obtain the dynamics of the mean path from Eq.
where a 1 (x) = (y− x)w(y, x)dy. On the condition that the derivations of the stochastic realizations from the mean path are relatively small which means that the variance of the mutation process is sufficient small, the above equation can be approximated as
Due to the symmetry of the mutation process, k 0 = k 2 = 0.
Using the first-order approximation of the fixation probability, we obtain the dynamics of the mean path d dt
Using the third-order approximation of the fixation probability, we obtain the dynamics of the mean path d dt
Note the bracket denoting the mean will cease using for simplicity in the following and main texts.
For constant population size and mutation process, k 1 is simply a parameter that affects time thus we obtain the conventional adaptive dynamics
The point satisfying η(x) = 0 is a singular strategy whose evolutionary direction is uncertain and needs further close investigations upon η (x) and ∂ 2 ∂y 2 y=x ζ(y, x) [10] . Assume x * is a singular strategy,
The singular point x * is an attracting point in the sense that the initially uniform population converges to it if η (
In the opposite case, i.e., η (x * ) > 0 or E(x * ) − F(x * ) > 0, the singular point is a repeller in that the initially uniform population evolves away from it and the bistable dynamics occur. The subsequent fate of the attracting singular point x * is up to the sign of E(x * ). If E(x * ) > 0, the attracting point x * is a branching point in the sense that the initially uniform population splits into two strategic clusters after it converges to x * . If E(x * ) < 0, the attracting point x * is a CESS in the sense that the population remains at x * after it approaches infinitely to or reach x * . If η (x * ) = 0,
x (t) = η(x) fails to determine the evolutionary direction of x * . Here we can employ the adaptive dynamics obtained by deterministic approximation in third order for the evolutionary mean path of continuous strategy. Since η(x * ) = 0 and the population size and the mutation process are constant, the adaptive dynamics is reduced to
III. THE ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS OF THE COOPERATIVE INVESTMENT
If each player adjusts the amount of contribution to the production of the public good according to his cooperative investment, the adaptive dynamics of the cooperative investment by using
is positive for x between 0 and 1. The points satisfying g (x)
h (x) = −n (i.e., B(x) = 0) are called singular points and the points satisfying
h (x) −n (i.e., B(x) 0) are termed non-singular points. The evolutionary direction of a non-singular point x is related to g (x) and h (x), and the evolutionary direction of a singular point needs a further investigation upon A (x) together with ∂ 2
. At singular points, we have
The evolutionary evolution of a singular point x * is related to g (x * ) and h (x * ). The singular point
. If the production function g(s) = a 3 s 3 + a 2 s 2 + a 1 s and the remaining function
are used, we get the following results. For linear production and remaining functions (i.e., a 3 = 0, b 3 = 0, a 2 = 0, b 2 = 0 and a 1 > 0), the adaptive dynamics result in no singular strategy and become,
For quadratic production and remaining functions (i.e., a 3 = 0, b 3 = 0, Under the conditions of large N and N >> n, we have x) ). Consequently, two types of adaptive dynamics exhibit the same evolutionary direction of a given non-singular point, the same singular points, consistent convergence but inconsistent stability of a given singular point. The necessary condition for the emergence of the branching point x * is g (x * ) < 0, which leads to x) ). Therefore, a branching point obtained bẏ 
determined approximation in first order for the mean path of x fail to determine the evolutionary direction. We adopt determined approximation in third order at x * ,
If the point x * meets G(x * ) 0 or H(x * ) 0, here the adaptive dynamics of x * is directional.
Otherwise, we can adopt the similar analysis of adaptive dynamics x (t) = B(x).
IV. THE ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS OF THE COOPERATIVE PROBABILITY
If each individual performs his action with his cooperative probability, the adaptive dynamics of the cooperative probability by using ρ(y, x) − ρ(x, x) [11] or p(y, x) − p(x, x) as 'invasion fitness'
are, 
. From now on, η(x) represents A(x) or B(x). How the singular point x * evolves is associated with the values of g( i+2 n ) − 2g( i+1 n ) + g( i n ) at i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n − 2}. A singular point x * satisfying D(x * ) < 0 (i.e., η (x * ) < 0 and ∂ 2 ∂y 2 y=x * (ζ(y, x * ) − ζ(x * , x * )) < 0) is a CESS yet a singular point x * satisfying D(x * ) > 0 (i.e., η (x * ) > 0) is a repeller.
When linear production function g(s) = a 1 s is used, the adaptive dynamics result in no singular strategy and become,
The convex production function g(s) leads to D(x) > 0 and A(x) is monotonously increasing, and the concave production function g(s) leads to D(x) < 0 and A(x) is monotonously decreas-ing. Therefore, the unique repeller emerges from the adaptive dynamics with convex g(s) and the unique CESS emerges from the adaptive dynamics with concave g(s). The co-occurrence of two singular strategies can be observed for symmetrically sigmoid g(s) or inverse sigmoid g(s) by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 [11] If g(s) is symmetrically sigmoid (or inverse sigmoid), specifically, g(s) is convex (or concave) in [0, 0.5) and concave (or convex) in [0.5, 1] satisfying, ∀s 1 ,
where x 1 is a repeller (or a CESS) and x 2 is a CESS (or a repeller).
It is obvious that D(1/2) = 0. When η(1/2) > 0 or η(0) = η(1) < 0, there are no singular strategies. When η(1/2) = 0, there exists one singular strategy. When η(1/2) < 0 and η(0) = η(1) ≥ 0, there exist two singular strategies x 1 and x 2 satisfying 0 ≤ x 1 < 1/2 < x 2 ≤ 1. We have D(x 1 ) < 0 and D(x 2 ) > 0, meaning that x 1 is a CESS and x 2 is a repeller.
Under the conditions of large N and N >> n,we have A(x) ≈ B(x), A (x) ≈ B (x) and p(x, x) ). Consequently, two types of adaptive dynamics exhibit the same evolutionary direction of a given non-singular point, the same singular points, the consistent convergence but inconsistent stability of a given singular point. As to the cooperative probability, it is only possible to be the CESS or the repeller for the singular point coming from two types of adaptive dynamics, thus these two types of adaptive dynamics yield no inconformity upon the evolution of the cooperative probability.
If there exists a point x * satisfying η(x * ) = 0 and η (x * ) = 0 where η(x) represents A(x) or B(x), determined approximation in first order for the mean path of x fail to tell us the evolutionary direction. We adopt determined approximation in third order at x * ,
Here, the adaptive dynamics x (t) = G(x) at x * is obviously directional since φ(x) is the derivative of D(x). If the point Assuming y = x + σ where σ is sufficiently small, we have y) . If the strategy x is away from a singular strategy, i.e., ∂ ∂y | y=x ζ(y, x) 0, local game between x and y is of either type (i) or type (ii) by the first-order expansions of ζ(y, x) and ζ(x, y). Furthermore if an attracting singular point If the strategy x is the singular point emerging from the adaptive dynamics of the cooperative investment, we have
. Easily verified, all above four generic selection scenarios (i)-(iv) can occur in local games among the singular point and his nearby point, further they can occur in local game among two similar cooperative investment levels.
If the strategy x is the singular point coming from the adaptive dynamics of the cooperative probability, we have
Easily verified, local game between the CESS and his nearby strategy is only of type (i) and local game between the repeller and his neighboring point is only of type (ii). Moreover, the evolution of the cooperative probability cannot result in a branching point. Thus only selection scenarios (i) and (ii) appear in local game among the singular point and his nearby point, further evolutionary game dynamics described by type (iii) and type (iv) cannot appear in local games among two strategies with similar cooperative probability.
VI. COMPARISON OF TWO TYPES OF 'INVASION FITNESS'
In a large population with a homogeneous strategy x, the growth rate of a single mutant with y is Fig. 1 , the adaptive dynamics x (t) = B(x) predicts more accurate stability and thus it seems that p(y, x) − p(x, x) is more competent for the growth rate of a single mutant than ρ(y, x) − ρ(x, x) in large populations.
Moreover, Fig. 1 also shows that two strategic clusters stemming from evolutionary branching are not always driven to the boundaries of the strategy space but may instead to x = 1 and x = x 1 (x 1 small but non-zero). Similar to the analysis upon x (t) = A(x), adaptive dynamics x (t) = B(x) can be connected with the replicator dynamics of binary strategy by considering local games among two similar strategies.
VII. SIMULATION.
The population of size N is initialized with a homogeneous state. We asynchronously update the population by replacing a random focal individual α with an offspring as follows. The payoff of the focal individual α, F α , is determined by randomly choosing an n-person interaction including the focal individual α. Then a reference individual β differing from α is randomly chosen, whose payoff, F β , is obtained by another random n-person interaction. The focal individual α takes on the parent role with the probability w = F α −F β c (c guarantees w ≤ 1), otherwise the reference individual β does so. The offspring stays the same strategy with the parent without mutation. If a mutant emerges (with the probability u), the strategy of the offspring follows a Gaussian distribution with the parent strategy as mean and with a very small variance σ. We trace realistic trajectories of all individuals in a population. It has been rigorously proved that this evolutionary process converges in law to the solution of the adaptive dynamics [12] , as the distribution variance of mutation steps goes to zero. Therefore, with a sufficiently small mutation variance, a single realization can represent the average evolution of the population.
